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SECOND LECTURE ON THE
. CUTLER FOUNDATION

THE CUTLER LECTURES

Established at the College oj William and Mary
in Virginia by 1ames Goold Cutler
oj Rochester, N. Y.
o

The late James Goold Cutler, of Rochester,
New York, in making his generous gift to the
endowmen t of the Marshall-Wythe School of
Government and Citizenship in the College of
William and Mary provided, among other things,
that one lecture should be given at the College
in each calendar year by some person "who is an
outstanding authority on the Constitution of
the United States." Mr. Cutler wisely said that
it appeared to him that the most useful contribution he could make to promote the making of
democracy safe for the world (to in vert President Wilson's aphorism) was to promote serious
consideration by as ma'n y people as pqssible of
certain points fundamental and therefore vital
to the permanency of constitutional government in the United States. Mr. Cutler declared as a basic proposi tion that our political
system breaks down, when and where it fails,
because of the lack of sound education of the
people for , whom and by whom it was intended
to be carried on.
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently successful business men who took time from his

busy life to study constitutional government.
As a result of his study, he recognized with
unusual clearness the magnitude of our debt to
the makers, interpreters and defenders of the
Constitution of the United States.
He was deeply interested in the College of
William and Mary because he was a student of
history and knew what great contributions were
made to the cause of constitutional government
by men who taught and studied here- Wythe
and Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall, Monroe
and Tyler, and a host of others who made this
coun try great. He, therefore, thought it peculiarly fitting to endow a chair of government
here a~d to provide for a popular "lecture each
year by some outstanding authority on the
Constitution of the United States."
The second lecturer in the course was Honorable George W. Wickersham, former AttorneyGeneral of the United States, and now Chairman
of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.

JNO.

GARLAND POLLARD,

Dean oj the Marshall-Wythe School oj
Government and Citizenship oj the
College oj William and lVlary.

THE CONSTITUTION AND PRO·
HIBITION ENFORCEMENT*
The Constitution of the United States is one
of those extremely rare products of statesmanship, the excellence of which has not been impaired by the vicissi tudes of changing times,
the cri ticism of scholars, or the resen tmen t of
political factions. The idea that it was struck
off at a heat by the momen tary inspiration of a
man or a group of men, to which Mr. Gladstone,
in an outburst of admiration, gave expression,
has not stood the test of historical analysis.
But the far-reaching wisdom of the framers has
been emphasized by proof that the Constitution
was a development of well known principles of
English Government, modified and adapted to
the requirements of the newly enfranchised
American nation. The Constitutional Convention
built a structure adapted to the needs of centuries, upon the deep and sure foundations of
those principles of English liberty which had
been achiev~d in six hundred years of struggle.
None of its provisions ran counter to the funda*An address delivered at the College of William and Mary under
the auspices of the James Goold Cutler Foundation, on May 7, H129,
by George W. Wickersham, former Attorney-General of the United
States.

mental political principles of any considerable
number of the American people. It is true that "in
order to form a more perfect union," the Federal
Government was endowed with powers greater
than some of the leading statesmen 'of the time
thought wise or safe for the preservation of
individual liberty. But the feebleness of the
government of the Confederation had brought
the country into such chaotic condition that
the great majority of the people were quite
ready to accept a central government strong
enough to secure peace and justice at home
and to command respect abroad. The fact is,
that the Constitution was the product of the
aristocracy of the American Democracy: not
necessarily the aristocracy of birth or wealth,
but the aristocracy of brains and character. It
was framed by educated men, very largely
lawyers, but all men who had studied deeply
the history of governments in the past, and who
were capable of deducing sound conclusions
from the experience of other nations. The
highest statesmanship consists in the ability to
accurately read past history and apply its
lessons to the advancement of the interests of
one's own country, and in the avoidance of
those mistakes which in the past have brought
misfortune upon governments and the peoples
dependen t upon them.
r6]

To make a strong government, and at the same
time to preserve the liberty of the individual
citizen, and not so greatly to restrict the sovereignty of the States as to destroy local self-government, was the essential problem before the
Convention of 1787. How wisely and how successfully they wrought, is demonstrated by the
history of the one hundred and forty years succeeding the adoption of the Constitution.
In the framing of the Constitution the position
and powers of the Judiciary were recognized to
be of paramount importance. Under the Confederation, there were no separate national
courts. As a matter of fact, there was no nation.
The absence of courts of the Confederation constituted, perhaps, its greatest weakness. In the
Constitution of 1787, framed in order to form a
more perfect union and to establish justice, this
deficiency in the existing government was necessarily to .be dealt with, and by the Third Article,
it was declared:
"The judicial power of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."
The second section of the same Article specifically declared:
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Cons6[ 7
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tution,c' the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority;- to Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con suls;- to
all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;- to Controversies between two
or more States;- between a State and Citizens of
another State;- between citizens of different
States;- between citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects ~ "
Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, observes:
"The propriety and fitness of these judicial
powers seem to result, as a necessary consequence, from the union of these states in one
national government, and they may be considered as requisite to its existence. The judicial
power in every government must be coextensive
with the power of legislation . . . Were there
no power to interpret, pronounce, and execute
the law, the govern men t would ei ther perish
through its own imbecility, as was the case with
the articles of confederation, or other powers
must be assumed by the legislative body, to the
destruction of liberty."C)
The same section ~ of Article III provides that
~n all cases affecting ambassadors, other publi c
(1 ) 1 Kent, Lec ture 14.

(Ninth Ed. p. 322.)

[

~

]

min.isters and consuls and those in which a State
shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction. In all other cases before
mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with
such exceptions and under such regulations as
the Congress shall make. Paragraph 3 then provides as follows:
"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial . ,s hall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress,may by Law
have directed."
,
Probably nothing in the whole debates over
the Constitution, says Mr. Charles Warren in a
recen t work (2)
"is more astonishing than the slight discussion
reported by Madison as given to the Judiciary
Article of the report of the Committee of Detail
of August 6th. It is probable, however, that
Madison considerably condensed his notes on
this point owing to the technicalities of the
subject."
While Madison has not reported very much
discussion 'over this subject, yet in the debates
over the ratification of the Constitution in the
(2) "The Making of th e Constitution."

[ 9 ]

conventions of the various States, a great deal
was said concerning the necessity of establishing
independent courts, as contrasted with the expediency of vesting the Federal judicial power
in State tribunals, subject only to the right of
review in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Mr. Hamilton dealt with the subject at
length in at least four numbers of The Federalist
(Nos. 7S, 79, SO, Sl). It would be inappropriate
and wholly unnecessary here to review the
succinct and convincing arguments employed
by Hamilton in those papers, in showing the
necessity for the establishment of independent
courts of justice for the interpretation of legislative acts deriving their authority from, or
purporting to infringe upon, powers conferred
upon the Federal government or denied to the
State governments by the Constitution.
"The interpretation of the laws is the proper
and peculiar province of the courts," he says.
"A constitution is in fact and must be regarded
by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning
as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body. If there
should happen to be an irreconciliable variance
between the two, that which has the superior
obligation and validity ought, of course, to be
preferred; or in other words, the Constitution
ought to be preferred to a statute, the intention

r
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of the people to the in ten tion of their agen ts."
(No. 78.)
The argument in support of the exercise of
the powers of the Federal judiciary to hold
invalid an unconstitutional law has never been
more succinctly, forcibly and satisfactorily put
than in these words.
The necessity for the establishment of one
court of supreme and final jurisdiction in the
determination of questions arising under the
Constitution, was conceded by almost all concerned in framing or discussing the Constitution,
and scarcely ever has been disputed. Differences
of opinion always have existed as to the provisions vesting the judicial power of the United
States "in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."
Hamilton said this power
"is evidently calculated to obviate the necessity
of having recourse to the Supreme Court in
every case of Federal cognizance. It is intended
to enable the national government to institute
or authorize in each State or district of the
United States a tribunal competent to the determination of matters of national jurisdiction
within its terms." (Federalist, No. 81.)
He even thought there were substantial
reasons against conferring Federal power upon
the existing courts of the several States, for, he
said:
[ IT ]

"The most discerning can foresee how far the
prevalence of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction
of national causes; while every man may discover that courts constituted like those of some
of the States would be improper channels of
the judicial authority of the Union."
The inevitable diversity of opinion in the
different States would require an unrestrained
course of appeals to the Supreme Court, which,
even in 1787, Mr. Hamilton saw would be a
source of public and ' private inconvenience, and
which, in 19~9, would be a sheer impossibility,
for it would break down any single court with
the sheer weight of business. Moreover, the
character of the Federal judicial power, comprehending, as it does under the Constitution,
can troversies between ci tizens of differen t S ta tes
and between citizens of a State and foreign
citizens or subj~cts, peculiarly requires exercise
by a tribunal independent of local influences.
The First Congress under the Constitution
assembled at Philadelphia on March 4, 1789,
although a quorum of both Houses was not
present until April 6th. President Washington
was sworn in to office on April 30th, and thereupon the new government proceeded to function. (3)
(3) Story on Const., Sec. 278.

r
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One of the first duties to which the Congress
addressed itself was the preparation of a J udiciary Act. Mr. Charles Warren, the historian
of the Supreme Court, a few years ago published an interesting article in the Harvard Law
Review, entitled "New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789" (4) . No adequate account of this famous legislation, Mr.
Warren says, had ever been written, and Ellsworth's latest able and careful biographer said
in 1905 that "no complete history of the bill
can now be written." Mr. Warren, however,
found among the archives of the United States
not only the original draft of the Judiciary Act
as it was introduced into the Senate, but also
the original amendments to the draft bills submitted during the Committee and Senate debates, and a copy of the bill as it passed the
Senate ann went to the House. Those documents throw a new and constructive light upon
the history of the measure, which dispels,
among other things, the tradition that the bill
was drafted by Oliver Ellsworth and not materially changed during its passage into law.
Mr. Warren says it is clear now that very important, and, in some instances, vital changes
were made in the bill before it became law. He
states the fact to be that the final , form of the
(4 ) 37 Harv. Law Rev., p. 49.

[ 13
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Act and its subsequent history cannot be properly understood unless it is realized that it was
a compromise measure, so framed as to secure
the votes of those who, while willing to see the
experimen t of the Federal Cons ti tu tion tried,
were insistent that the Federal courts should be
given the minimum powers and jurisdiction.
"Its provisions completely satisfied no one,
although they pleased the anti-Federalists more
than the Federalists."
Compromise as it was, it remained almost
unchanged for nearly a century. But M r.
Warren points out that the Judiciary Act was
not only a compromise, but . its final form was
closely tied up with, and largely depended upon,
the fate of the various amendmen ts to the J udiciary Article of the Constitution, which were
being debated in Congress during the discussion
over the Judiciary Act. It is a matter of familiar knowledge that objection was made in
many of the States to the absence from the new
Constitution of a Bill of Rights, and that ratification of the Constitution was only secured by
the promise of its friends to lend their influence
and their best efforts to the immediate adoption
of amendments to the Constitution which would
supply this defect. It was particularly objected
that the judicial power was not subject to reasonable restraint; that trial by jury in criminal
[ qj

cases was not adequately secured, and was not
at all required in civil cases.
Consideration of these proposed amendmen ts
proceeded in the First Congress at the same time
that the Committee was drafting ' the Judiciary
Act. After a long debate, the Senate voted to
establish Federal District Courts, and after a
struggle over the jurisdiction with which they
were to be invested, the jurisdiction as specified
in the bill was agreed to. The bill was laid aside
in the House of Representatives, pending the
discussion over the proposed amendments to
the Constitution. There had been serious apprehension among many of the delegates to the
various State Conventions lest the new Federal
government should not only invade the jurisdiction of States, but that unless restrained by
positive provisions in the fundamental law, it
would encroach upon the very rights of the
citizen to secure which the War of Independence
had been successfully waged. Patrick Henry, in
Virginia, Mr. Holmes, in Massachusetts, and
many other delegates in those and other States
complained of the inadequacy of the Third
Article of the Constitution to fully ensure all
the privileges of the citizen guaranteed by the
great charters of English liberty- Magna Charta,
the Bill of Rights and the Habeas Corpus Act.
Mr. Henry delcared:

[ I5 1

"My mind will not be quieted till I see something substantial come forth in the shape of a
bill of rights." (3 Eliot's Debates, 46~.)
His apprehensions were shared by many
others. These objections did not prevent the
adoption of the Constitution, but, as Judge
Story says:
"They produced such a strong effect upon the
public mind, that Congress, immediately after
their first meeting, proposed certain amend'ments, embracing all the suggestions which
appeared of most force; and these amendments
were ratified by the several States, and are now
become a part of the Constitution."(5)
Not until those amendments were passed by
the House, was the consideration of the Judiciary
Bill again taken up. As a result of the discussions in both Houses, the Judiciary Bill in
its final form was signed by the President on
September ~4, 1789, and on the same day, the
Senate and the House finally agreed on the form
of twelve Amendments to the Constitution to
be submitted to the States. Those amendments,
of which ten subsequently were agreed to by
the requisite number of States, included two of
importance in their bearing upon the question
here under discussion. The Fifth Amendmen t
reads as follows:
(5 ) 1 Story on Const., 5th Ed., Sec. 1782.

[ 16 1

"Article V. No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
The Sixth Article is as follows:
"Article VI. In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have ,the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence."
The Judiciary Act provided for a Supreme
Court composed of a Chief Justice and five
Associate Justices. It divided the United States
in to thirteen districts, l~nq. 'i pr,o;vided for the
establishment in each of1those districts of a
District Court, consisting -.of :one Judge, to
[ 17 1

reside in the District for which he is appointed,
and the allocation of those districts among three
Circuits, in each of which was established a
Circuit Court, to be holden by two Justices of
the Supreme Court and the District Judge of
such District, two of whom should constitute a
quorum . The jurisdiction of the District Courts
was prescribed in the nin th section as follows:
"That the District Courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States,
cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall
be cognizable under the authority of the United
States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the high seas; where no other
punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty
stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars,
or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six
months, is to be inflicted; and shall also have
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including
all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or
trade of the United States, where the seizures
are made, on waters which are navigable from
the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen,
within their respective districts as well as upon
the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the
right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it; and shall also
have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures
on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made,
and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures
incurred, under the laws of the United States.
[ 18
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And shall also have cognizance, concurrent with
the courts of the several States, or the circuit
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
And shall also have cognizance, concurrent as
last mentioned, of all suits at common law where
the United States sue, and the matter in dispute
amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value
of one hundred d.ollars. And shall also have
jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the
several States, of all suits against consuls or
vice-consuls, except for offenses above the
description aforesaid. And the trial of issues in
fact, in the district courts, in all causes except
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury." (6)
Section 11 defined the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Courts. They were given original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States,
"of all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five
hundred dollars, and the United States are
plain tiffs, or peti tioners; or an alien is a party,
or the suit is between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State. And shall have exclusive cognizance of
all crimes ' and offences cognizable under the
authority of the United States, except where
(6) 1 Stats. at L. 77.

[ 19
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this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the
United States shall otherwise direct, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of
the crimes and offences cognizable therein . . . "
The Circuit Courts were also given appellate
jurisdiction from the District Courts, under
regulations and restrictions in the Act provided.
The unlimited power vested in Congress by
Section 1 of Article III, to establish inferior
courts, has been exercised only to a limited
.degree. The Judiciary Act of 1789, as we have
seen, established District and Circuit Courts.
The Circuit Courts established by the Act of
February 13, 1801, followed by the appointment
of the so-called "midnight Judges" by President
John Adams, were promptly legislated out of
existence when the Jeffersonian Administration
'came into power, on March 8, 180~. Although
there was some modification in the Circuit
Courts as established by the Judiciary Act of
1789, no radical change was made in the system
of Federal Courts created by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, until the establishment of the
Circuit Courts of Appeal by the Act of March 3,
189l.
The COt;lrt of Cla:ims, created by the Act of
February ~4, 1855 (10 Stat. 61~), in the true
sense of the term, is not a court. It passes upon
claims against the governmen t, bu tits judgmen ts
r
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are only advisory, and rest for their execution
upon the will of Congress in its appropriation
acts. But, as Chief Justice Taney said, in the
opinion he prepared for the case of Gordon v.
United States (117 U . S. 697, 702) :
"The award of execution is a part, and an
essen tial part of every judgmen t passed by a
court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it."
The Court of Private Land Claims, established by the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 854)
falls within the same category. Neither of them
can properly be called "inferior courts of t he
United States" within the meaning of Article
III of the Constitution.
The Court of Customs Appeals, created by
the Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, has also been
heJd to be merely a legislative court (Ex Parte
Bakelite Corporation, U. S. Supreme Court,
May 20, ] 929), though its status has again been
thrown into doubt by t he recent enactment of
Congress (March 2, 1929, No. 914) giving it
jurisdiction in patent cases.
The Commerce Court, established by the Act
of June 18, 1910, was aboJished by the Act of
October 22, 1913 (38 Stat. 219). The Board of
General Appraisers, under the Tariff Acts, has
in recent times been called a court, and now is
[ '2 I

1

designated by legislation the Customs Court,C)
but the decision in the Bakelite case treats it
as another legislative court.
The District Courts of the United States remain the only courts of first instance in criminal
matters. From an early day it has been settled
that the only crimes of which the Federal courts
have jurisdiction are those created by Acts of
Congress, and consequently the only acts which
Congress may make punishable as crimes, are
those within the legislative powers conferred
upon Congress by the Constitution. With the
adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, on
January ~9, 1919, followed by the enactment of
the Prohibition Enforcement Law, October ~8,
1919, a totally new volume of criminal jurisdiction has developed upon these Courts. The
Amendment, in succinct but comprehensive
terms, prohibited, after one year from the
ratification of the Article,
"the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from
the United States and all territory subject
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes."
The Prohibition Enforcement Law put in
legislative form meticulous prohibitions against
(1) Frankfurter and Landis, "The Business of the Supreme Court."
[ 22
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manifold acts which might come within the
intent, if not the express language of the Amendment, and created a wide range of offenses, many
of which are of a character that in almost all
of the States, would be dealt with in courts of
limited and inferior jurisdiction, but which,
under the Federal system, have served to clog
the dockets of the district courts, and cause
. infinite delay in the enforcement of civil remedies in those tribunals.
Prior to the enactment of the so-called Jones
Law, on March 2, 1929, many of the prohibited acts were declared to be misdemeanors
and punishable with fines of from $500.00 to
$1,000.00 and by imprisonment for from thirty
days to twelve mon ths .
The Fifth Amendment declares that no person
shall be held to answer for an infamous crime
unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury. In a general way, any act punishable by law as being forbidden by statute, or
injurious to public welfare, is denominated a
crime, but commonly the word is used only with
respect to grave offenses. Blackstone says:(8)
"A crime or misdemeanor is
or omitted, in violation of a
forbidding or commanding
definition comprehends both
(8) IV Commentaries.

Ch. 1, p. 5.

[ 23 1

an act committed
public law either
it. This general
crimes and mis-

demeanors, which, properly speaking, are mere
synonymous terms; though, in commo.n usage,
the word 'crimes' is made to denote such offenses
as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while
smaller faults, and omissions of ress consequence, are comprised under the geri. tler names
of 'misdemeanors' only."
By the United States Code (Crimil1;:ti Code
and Criminal Procedure), Title 18, Part ~,
Section 541, all offenses which may be punished
by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, shall be deemed felonies. All other
offenses shall be deemed misdemeanors. I t is
well settled that all felonies, as thus defined,
are infamous crimes, for which no person shall
be held to answer unless on a presen tmen t or
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases
,arising in the land or naval forces or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or
public danger. It is said to be equally well
settled that misdemeanors punishable by fine
or by terms of imprisonment not exceeding one
year, unless there should be coupled with the
pllnishment or imprisonment some specific provision making the particular misdemeanor infamous, are not infamous crimes within the
purview of the Fifth Amendment, ~nd may be
prosecu ted by information. (9) So it has been
(9) Falconi v. United States, 280 Fed. 766.
[ 24
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held that prosecution for the first offense of
selling liquor, which by Section ~9 of the
National Prohibition Act is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six months, without
provision for sentence at hard labor, and which,
therefore, is a statutory misdemeanor, under
the Criminal Code, may be by information, and
need not be by indictment.eO)
The Court in the last cited case appears to
make the test that if the offense is not a felony
by the statute and can be punished only by
imprisonment for twe(ve months or less, without
hard labor, it is a misdemeanor and not an infamous crime, and may be prosecuted by information without indictment.
The convenience of prosecution by information is especially obvious in those communities
where the Grand Jury meets at rare intervals,
say quarterly or even semi-annually. As a
commentator on the recent legislation says:
"The only way by which the court calendars
have been kept reasonably clear of trials for
liquor law violations has been by avoiding jury
trial, as a result of defendants pleading guilty."
Rarely, says the writer, does an accused
person plead guilty unless he has something to
gain by the plea. The accused violator of the
( 10 ) Cleueland v. Mattingly (Court of Appeals, D. C.), 287 Fed. 948;
certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 744.
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National Prohibition Act has something to
gain. He dickers and fences with the prosecuting
attorney. He will plead guilty provided the
punishment is only a fine of such and such
an amount. The attorney agrees.(II)
By the Act of March 2, 1929, known as the
Jones Act, supplementing the National Prohi bi tion Act, it is provided:
"Sec. 1. That wherever a penalty or penalties are prescribed in a criminal prosecution by
the National Prohibition Act, as amended and
supplemented, for the illegal manufacture, sale,
transportation, importation, or exportation of
intoxicating liquor, as defined by section 1,
Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, the
penalty imposed for each such offense shall be a
fine of not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not
to exceed five years, or both: . . . "
"Sec. 2. This Act shall not repeal nor eliminate any minimum penalty for the first or any
subsequent offense now provided by the said
National Prohibition Act."
Section 29 of the National Prohibition Act
provides:
"Any person who manufactures or sells liquor
in violation of this Chapter, shall for the first
offense be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not exceeding six months."
(11) The Jones-Stalker Law, by Goodwin Cooke, American Bar
Association Journal, ~ay, 1929, page 276.

[ 26 1

This establishes a maxtmum, but not a
minimum penalty for a first offense and therefore is not saved by Section ~9 of the Prohibition Act.
There are a number of offenses specified in the
Prohibition Law which are denominated misdemeanors and punishable by a fine of not
more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both.( 2 ) Whether or
not misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment
for twelve months and by a fine of $1,000 as
a minimum, would be considered misdemean,9rs,
which may be prosecuted by information only,
is perhaps doubtful. The decisions upholding
prosecution by information uniformly deal with
« pet t y mls
'demeanors, " " pet t y orrenses
IT" ;
"smaller faults or omissions of less consequence."
A more serious question arises with respect
to the right of trial by jury, secured by Article
III, Section ~, Clause 3, of the Constitution,
in the prosecution of all crimes, except in case
of impeachment, supplemented by the provisions
of the Sixth Amendment that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed. That the framers
(12) See Supplemental Act, November 23, 1921, Sec. 6; National
Prohibiton Act, Sec. 24; Same, Title 3, Sec. 15, Sec. 20.
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of the Constitution meant to limit the right of
trial by jury in the Sixth Amendment to those
persons who are subject to indictment or presentment in the Fifth, was declared by the
Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte Milligan,
4 'Vall. ~, 1~3. On the other hand, as had been
pointed out by the Supreme Court in another
case:(13)
"According to many adjudged cases, arising
un<;ler constitutions which declare, generally,
that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, there are certain minor or petty offenses
that may be proceeded against summarily, and
without ajury; and, in respect to other offenses,
the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the
right to a trial by jury in an appellate court is
accorded to the accused."
There seems to be an abundance of authority
on the point that in England, it has been the
constant course of legislation for cen turies past,
to confer summary jurisdiction upon justices of
the peace for the trial and conviction of minor
statutory offenses, and the same has been the
practice in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Vermont,
Georgia and other States. (13a)
The same principle was asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Schick v. United States,(14) in sustaining a
(13 ) Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S., 540, 552.
(13 a) Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 552, 553.
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(14 ) 195 U. 5.65.

conviction for the violation of the provisions of
the Oleomargarine Law, punishable by a penalty of $50 fine, for each offense, which was
tried on information and by a court, upon waiver
of a jury trial by the parties. The Court held
that so simple a penalty for violating a revenue
statute, indicated only a petty offense, and not
one necessarily involving any moral delinquency.
Mr. Justice Brewer, writing the opinion of the
Court, said:
"The tru th is, the nature of the offense and
the amount of punishment prescribed rather
than its place in the statutes determine whether
it is to be classed among serious or petty offenses,
whether among crimes or misdemeanors. . . .
In such a case there is no constitutional requirement of a jury."
The Court held that the body of the Constitution does not include a petty offense of the
character described. It must be read in the light
of the common law. The Convention, in framing
Article III of the Constitution, employed the
language, "the trial of all crimes," instead of, as
originally drafted, "the trial of all criminal
offenses," shall be by jury. There is no public
policy which forbids the waiver of a jury in
the trial of petty offenses, because there was no
constitutional or statutory provision or public
policy which required a jury in the trial of

petty offenses. Here the penalty was very
light. All of the Court but Harlan, J., agreed to
the judgment.
In the case of the United States v. Praeger,(1S)
District Judge-Maxey, in Texas, held that where
the punishment provided by Congress for the
act under consideration was a fine of not more
than $500 or imprisonment not to exceed six
mon ths, or both, at the discretion of the Court,
the parties had the right, under the authority of
Schick v. United States,(16) by written stipulation, to waive a jury.
In Frank v. United States,(17) a violation of a
section of the Food and Drug Act, which provided for no imprisonment, but merely a fine
not exceeding $~OO, was held to be a petty
offense, which did not require trial by jury.
In Coates v. United States,(1S) defendant was
indicted for a violation of the National Prohibition Act on five counts: (1) for the unlawful
possession of intoxicating liquors; (~) the unlawful possession of property designated for the
manufacture of such liquor; (3) the actual
manufacture; (4) the sale; (5) the maintenance
of a nuisance where intoxicating liquor was
being manufactured, kept, bottled and sold.
He was convicted on the first, second, third and
(15) 149 Fed. 474.
(16) 195 u. S. 65.

(17) 192 Fed. 864 (C.

c. A. 6th Circ.)

(18) 290 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th Circ.)
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fifth coun ts. It was held by the Circui t Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that these
offenses were crimes which could only be tried
by a jury, and that the defendants could not
waive a jury. Citing Thompson v. Utah, 170
U. S. 343.
In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, the Court
said that there are offenses which are not crimes,
and in them a jury may be dispensed with by
consen t. They are of the kind which the common
law classes as petty, as well from th"e prevailing
consequences which conviction of them would
entail upon the one committing them, as from
the lack of any substantial moral blameworthiness necessarily implied in their commISSIon.
The question then becomes one of relativity,
depending upon the seriousness of the charge. A
prosecution for a first offense under Section 29
of the National Prohibition Act could probably
be initiated by information, and tried without a
jury. Certainly a jury might be waived in such a
case. But for any other offense under the Act,
including second offenses under Section 29, it
is quite clear that the prosecution must be by
indictment, and trial must be by a jury.
Trial by jury, the Supreme Court has held, is
not simply trial by a jury of twelve men before
an officer vested with authority to cause them
[ 3I 1

to be summoned and impanelled, to administer
oaths to them and to the officer in charge, and
to en ter judgment and issue execu tion on their
verdict,
"but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the
presence and under the superintendence of a
judge empowered to instruct them on the law
and to advise them on the facts, and (except on
acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their
verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or
the evidence." (19)
Mr. Justice Gray, in writing the opinion
in this case, cited an earlier decision where
the Court said:
"Trial by jury in the courts of the United
States is a trial presided over by a judge, with
authority, not only to rule upon objections to
evidence, and to instruct the jury upon the law,
but also, when in his judgment the due administration of justice requires it, to aid the jury by
explaining and commenting upon the testimony,
and even giving them his opinion on questions
of fact, provided only he submits those questions to their determination." (U. S. v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 123 U. S., 113, 114.)
The fact that the guaran tee of trial by jury
secured by the Constitution of the United States
necessarily implies, not only that the facts shall
be determined by a jury of twelve men, but that
(19 ) Capitol Traction Co. v. Hoj, 174 U.

r :n 1

s. 1, 13.

the trial must. be conducted by a judge, with
authority, in his discretion, whenever he thinks
it necessary to assist the jury in arriving at a
just conclusion, to comment upon the evidence,
call their attention to parts of it which he thinks
important, and express his opinion upon the
facts, is not always realized in discussions about
trial by jury. It is a part of the guaranty of
justice to the citizen, but it is also an obstacle
in the way of establishing an inferior Federal
Court of Criminal Justice, such as exists in
many States, for the trial of even serious misdemeanors by the Court without a jury.
Moreover, the judicial power of the United
States can be exercised only by the Supreme
Court, or an inferior court established under
the terms of the Constitution, and this implies
that the Court must be presided over by a judge
appointed in conformity with that instrument.
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution
provides:
"The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."

In view of these provisions, the Supreme Court
has held that justices of the peace in the Dis[ 33
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trict of Columbia are not judges of inferior
courts of the United States, as they are not
appointed to that office during good behavior;
and that trial by a jury before a justice of the
peace, having been unknown in England or
America before the Declaration of Independence,
was not within the contemplation of Congress
in proposing, or the people in ratifying, the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, it may be taken as settled that no prosecution of any violation of an act of Congress,
including the National Prohibition Act, for any
offense more serious than a minor misdemeanor,
could be tried without a jury, or could be tried
in any tribunal' which cannot be characterized
as an inferior court of the United States, within
the meaning of the Constitution construed as
above men tioned.
These limitations constitute serious obstacles
to the establishment of a Federal court of inferior criminal jurisdiction for the disposition
of violations of the National Prohibition Act.
Not only do the .restrictions as to trial by jury
and as to indictment interfere, but the provision
requiring trials to be held in the State where
the crime shall have been committed, probably
would make necessary such an extensive multiplication of courts as to amount to a practical
embargo upon dealing with minor' offenses
[ 34
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under the existing Prohibition Laws many
other way than through the existing District
Courts.
The policy of the Jones Act, which seeks to
compel observance of the Prohibition Law by
extremely rigorous penalties, probably will defeat itself through the consequences which it
entails in requiring prosecution by indictment,
and not by information, and trial by jury for
almost all violations. This will mean one of two
things: either a very large increase in the number of Federal Judges, or the continued embarrassment of civil litigants in the delays
caused by the swelling tide of criminal indictments and trials under the Prohibition Act.
In the Jones Act itself there was interjected a
proviso which can be effective only as friendly
counsel to the judiciary. I t reads as follows:
"That it is the intent of Congress that the
court, in imposing sentence hereunder, should
discriminate between casual or slight violations
and habitual sales of intoxicating liquor, or
attempts to commercialize violations of the law."
Far more effective than such a counsel of
perfection to the judiciary would it be, if Congress should discriminate in its legislation by
providing specifically for the punishment of
"casual or slight violations" of the law, by
denominating them as misdemeanors or petty
[ 35 ]

offenses, and affixing to such offenses penal ties
which would not raise them above the grade of
petty misdemeanors which may be prosecuted
by information, and tried by a court without a
jury. This would result in a more speedy and
effective enforcement of the law upon all except
those engaged in "habitual sales of intoxicating
liquor or attempts to commercialize violations
of the law." The latter being serious offenses
against the social body, in violation of the Constitution and statute law, may be dealt with
as other serious offenses are, by indictment and
trial by jury.
.
Such a policy as that recommended was actually adopted by Congress in the District of Columbia Prohibition Law of March 3, 1917, which
prohibited any person from directly or indirectly,
in the District of Columbia, manufacturing or
importing for sale or gift, selling, offering for
sale, keeping for sale, trafficking in, etc., etc.,
any alcoholic or other prohibited liquors, for
beverage purposes, and made any persons who
should violate the provisions of the Act guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof,
subject to be fined not less than $300 nor more
than $1,000 and to be imprisoned in the District
jailor work-house for a period of not less than
thirty days or more than one year, for each
offense. Other offenses against different pro[ 36 1

VISIons of the Act were denominated misdemeanors and made punishable by fines of not
less than $50 nor more than $300, or imprisonment in the jailor workhouse of the District
for not more than six months (Sec. 3); and in
various sections, offenses against provisions in
the Act are declared to be misdemeanors punishable by fines ,in amounts of $50, $100, $300 and
$500, as the case might be, and imprisonment in
the District j ail or workhouse for terms, in no
instance exceeding twelve months, and in many
instances being limited to from thirty days to
six months. The Act was obviously drawn with
a view to providing for its enforcement through
punish men t before a local magistrate by small
-fines or limited terms of imprisonment in the
District jailor workhouse.
The theory of the later legislation developed
through the opposition to the enforcement of .
the law which has been encountered since its
enactment, has been to increase penalties until
they have reached almost the same importance
as those attributed to the most infamous crimes.
It is yet to be demonstrated that respect for
this law or for law in general shall be achieved
by such policy.
Lord Bryce, in the American Commonwealth,
says:
"The American Constitution is no exception
r 37
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to the rule that everything which has power to
win the obedience and respect of men must
have its roots deep in the past, and that the
more slowly every institution has grown so
much the more enduring is it likely to prove." (20)
The results of efforts to compel observance
of particular laws by the imposition of extreme
penalties, generally have proved unsatisfactory
and it would seem probable that with respect to
a law concerning which there is as much difference of opinion as the Prohibition Law, the
existing legislative policy probably will not
realize the objects of its enactment. A legislative
scheme of small penalties, easily enforced, which
would not leave it merely to the discretion of a
judge in imposing sentence to discriminate between casual or slight violations and habitual
sales of liquor, and attempts to commercialize
violations of the law, while at the same time
empowering him to impose penalties of an extremely rigorous character for the more serious
category of offenses, would be far more effective
in bringing about general observance of the pro hibitory provisions. The history of the law is
replete with failure to compel respect and compliance by excessive penalties. Not the possibility of severe punishment, but swift and sure
penalty for violation compels obedience to law.
(2' ) I Am. Com. p. 29.
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